Gauge-Underdetermination and Shades of Locality in the Aharonov–Bohm Effect by Mulder, Ruward A
Vol.:(0123456789)
Foundations of Physics (2021) 51:48
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10701-021-00446-9
1 
Gauge‑Underdetermination and Shades of Locality 
in the Aharonov–Bohm Effect
Ruward A. Mulder1 
Received: 1 April 2020 / Accepted: 20 February 2021 / Published online: 9 April 2021 
© The Author(s) 2021
Abstract
I address the view that the classical electromagnetic potentials are shown by the 
Aharonov–Bohm effect to be physically real (which I dub: ‘the potentials view’). 
I give a historico-philosophical presentation of this view and assess its prospects, 
more precisely than has so far been done in the literature. Taking the potential as 
physically real runs prima facie into ‘gauge-underdetermination’: different gauge 
choices represent different physical states of affairs and hence different theories. 
This fact is usually not acknowledged in the literature (or in classrooms), neither by 
proponents nor by opponents of the potentials view. I then illustrate this theme by 
what I take to be the basic insight of the AB effect for the potentials view, namely 
that the gauge equivalence class that directly corresponds to the electric and mag-
netic fields (which I call the Wide Equivalence Class) is too wide, i.e., the Narrow 
Equivalence Class encodes additional physical degrees of freedom: these only play 
a distinct role in a multiply-connected space. There is a trade-off between explana-
tory power and gauge symmetries. On the one hand, this narrower equivalence class 
gives a local explanation of the AB effect in the sense that the phase is incrementally 
picked up along the path of the electron. On the other hand, locality is not satisfied in 
the sense of signal locality, viz. the finite speed of propagation exhibited by electric 
and magnetic fields. It is therefore intellectually mandatory to seek desiderata that 
will distinguish even within these narrower equivalence classes, i.e. will prefer some 
elements of such an equivalence class over others. I consider various formulations 
of locality, such as Bell locality, local interaction Hamiltonians, and signal locality. 
I show that Bell locality can only be evaluated if one fixes the gauge freedom com-
pletely. Yet, an explanation in terms of signal locality can be accommodated by the 
Lorenz gauge: the potentials propagate in waves at finite speed. I therefore suggest 
the Lorenz gauge potentials theory—an even narrower gauge equivalence relation—
as the ontology of electrodynamics.
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1  Preamble: What there is in the Lecture Halls
How do our theories of physics relate to what actually exists in the world? In the 
everyday life of physicists, both in the lab of the experimenter and on the paper of 
the theorist, such a question is rarely helpful for directly solving specific problems. 
Nevertheless, questions like ‘what is the quantum state exactly?’, ‘is there really 
energy in the world?’ or ‘does light actually consist of photons or of electromag-
netic waves?’ are commonplace in the minds of students. Often, such questions are 
evaded, as if asking for things that are not obscure by accident and into which one 
should not delve too deeply. Unmistakeably, part of this reluctance about dealing 
with such questions lies in the difficulty of conceptual reasoning in mathematical 
theories that are designed to solve practical problems.
In lectures on electrodynamics during undergraduate years in physics, the intro-
duction of the electromagnetic potentials as follows is commonplace:
The fact that Maxwell’s equations show that the electric and magnetic fields 
can propagate on their own and carry energy over long distances, shows that 
they are physically real. Let us now introduce the electromagnetic potentials 
through their relation with these fields,  = −∇ − ∕t and  = ∇ ×  . 
These are introduced for mathematical convenience, mind you, and have more 
degrees of freedom than the actual physical degrees of freedom.
This appears unproblematic: the ‘actual physical’ degrees of freedom are encoded 
in the  and  fields and the role of the ‘extra’ structure can be understood as con-
venient for the practical purposes of the calculations that await the student. After all, 
the task of finding the value of the potential between two conducting plates that is 
high enough to ionize the hydrogen atom might not leave much time to question the 
physical nature of that voltage.
But what is to stop an eccentric from adhering to a ‘potentials view’, where  
and  correspond to real things in the world? Empirical data does not rule out such 
a move, since the potential theory is empirically equivalent (at least in the classi-
cal domain). Of course, the term ‘Ockham’s razor’ (which is often bandied about) 
applies in the sense that we presumably should not add extra structure when it is 
unnecessary. Yet opinions over what is necessary diverge. Particularly for these two 
electromagnetic theories—apparently making the same predictions—additional cri-
teria come into play.
Near the end of the semester, the professor admits that his initial claim, that the 
potentials merely serve an auxiliary role, has a caveat:
Remember the claim that  and  are merely convenient constructs that only 
help us solve problems? It turns out that in quantum theory this is no longer 
really true, because of the Aharonov–Bohm effect. I will not go into it now, 
but you will see that gauge degrees of freedom have a direct effect on quantum 
observables.
Although it makes for an exciting cliff-hanger, the student is often left hanging there. 
When the AB effect is discussed in the subsequent advanced quantum mechanics 
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courses, the reasons for taking  and  to be physically real, and the nature of gauge 
degrees of freedom, are often omitted. Indeed, although some sense of locality is the 
sole reason for taking  and  as real, the word ‘locality’ is rarely mentioned.
2  Outline of the Problem and the Argument
The Aharonov–Bohm effect shows that there are situations in which the phase of the 
wavefunction of a charged quantum probe is influenced at locations where the mag-
netic (and electric) field vanishes, whereas the vector potential  does not. Thus, in 
brief, one must conclude that either the magnetic field  acts in a non-local way or 
the -field plays a physical role.1 But if the former: in what way? And if the latter: in 
what way? The Aharonov–Bohm effect (AB effect) thereby highlights the difficulty 
of understanding theories that admit local gauge transformations; it puts a question 
mark on our understanding of what gauge transformations are in the first place.
This paper is a historico-philosophical evaluation of the ‘potentials view’ as 
opposed to the ‘fields view’. On the potentials view—adhered to by most physi-
cists—the potentials, rather than the  and  fields, are taken as the physical players 
of the theory, so that the potentials are not just auxiliary mathematical conveniences.
In experimental physics, aspects of the AB effect have flourished in recent years 
(for example the occurrence of a magnetic edge in graphene rings [1]), but pro-
gress has been slower in finding an explanation of the AB effect, as pointed out 
by Batelaan and Tonomura in 2009 [2, p.38] “the investigation and exploitation of 
the AB effect remain far from finished.” Tran recently challenged the idea that the 
formulation of Maxwell’s equations is settled science, even in the classical case [3]. 
Although alternative ways of deriving the effect in didactic ways are promoted, for 
example by focusing on the de Broglie wavelength [4], the conceptual consequences 
of the potentials view are rarely taught. Berry adopts the potentials view by claiming 
that the “gauge-invariant part of the vector potential was promoted to a real physi-
cal field, not just a convenient device for summarizing certain information about the 
electric and magnetic fields” [5].
To make things more precise, let me define the two views that involve an inter-
pretation of the potentials.
Potentials view: the scalar potential field () and vector potential field () 
are physical (that is, more real than mathematical fictions), over and above the 
degrees of freedom that give rise to the electric field () and magnetic field 
() . A short-hand notation for this interpretation will be ( ,)-theory.
This is in contrast with the rival view:
Fields view: only the degrees of freedom that directly give rise to the electric 
field () and magnetic field () are physical and any additional (mathemat-
1 This dichotomy of course assumes that there is no third candidate that provides a mechanism to explain 
the effect but that is hidden somewhere in the formalism and therefore overlooked; cf. footnote 2.
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ical) degrees of freedom of the potentials are pure mathematical fictions. A 
short-hand notation for this interpretation will be ( ,)-theory.
The fields view is the traditional interpretation, but it is logically quite strong: its 
defenders share the belief that the electric and magnetic fields are sufficient for 
explaining all electrodynamic phenomena. On the contrary, within the potentials 
view there is ample leeway. The reason is that one has to choose where to draw the 
line between physical and fictional degrees of freedom, resulting in many different 
positions—none of which are uncontroversial2—but which share commitment to the 
physicality of all or some of the degrees of freedom which were considered unphysi-
cal degrees of freedom by the traditional fields view.
In what follows, I will initially be concerned with the naive version of the poten-
tials view which says ‘the potentials are real’ without specifying what we mean by 
that. This will involve some fuzziness about both locality and reality criteria; but 
the initial focus on the naive view helps to tease out the philosophical commitments 
that play a role in these controversies. Also, this view appears to me to be the most 
straightforward way to give a local explanation of the AB effect. In the second half 
of the paper, the focus will shift to the more precise language of equivalence classes 
in order to sharpen intuitions about locality and ontology.
I will approach the debate over the ( ,A)-theory or (E,B)-theory from the viewpoint 
of underdetermination, which sheds light on the role of locality and reality in theory 
choice. I explore the Aharonov–Bohm effect and the potentials formalism in Sects. 3–4 
in such a way that all steps in the calculations are present. Then, I emphasize that if one 
regards the potentials as completely real, as many do, there must also be a preferred 
gauge. If one does not choose a preferred gauge, it is impossible to avoid what I call 
‘gauge-underdetermination’ (Sect. 5). Thus, one needs either to appeal to a criterion for 
the preferred gauge or to weaken the statement that the potentials are real. This is often 
brushed over or misunderstood in the literature about gauge theories, as illustrated by 
2 Here I give a brief review of prominent interpretations of electrodynamics in light of the AB effect. 
The first is the holonomies view, advocated by Healey, in which the loop integrals of the potentials are 
promoted to physical ontology [6]. Unlike the potentials, these loops are gauge-invariant quantities; 
unlike the fields, they are non-locally possessed properties which nonetheless act locally—and at least 
they are defined in the region where the electrons move [7]. Another view is taken by Mattingly, who 
argues that gauge fields do not commit us to any novel ontology and that the effect should be under-
stood in terms of the sum of 4-current fields of single charged particles [8]. Here, ‘distributivity’ fails 
in the sense that the electron is sensitive to the component fields, even while the net field vanishes. The 
4-current field would carry information but no energy-momentum [9]. Boyer argues that the AB effect is 
explained by the back-reaction of the E and B fields of the charged particles themselves, which interact 
with the solenoid [10]. Vaidman argues that the potentials merely seem real due to the stringent canonical 
formulation of quantum dynamics (the Schrödinger equation necessarily deals with a potential instead of 
fields or forces: cf. Eq. (3.1)). Therefore, Vaidman calls upon the community to seek a reformulation of 
quantum mechanics in terms of the electric and magnetic fields and without potentials [11, 12]. Aharo-
nov himself, together with Cohen and Rohrlich replied to Vaidman that the effect may be due to a local 
gauge potential or due to non-local gauge-invariant fields [13, 14]. Clarity on these issues is especially 
important in the light of the calculations performed by Pearle and Rizzi, who have worked out Vaid-
man’s idea of including the solenoid in the AB experiment into a fully quantum-mechanical description 
[15]. This ‘Vaidman-ACR debate’, as we might dub it, is a contemporary example of a dispute in which 
extra-empirical values play a crucial role in physical practice. I intend to evaluate this particular debate in 
future work.
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excerpts from influential authors (Sect. 6), sometimes leading to inconsistencies in the 
treatment of the AB effect.
To find criteria that soften gauge-underdetermination, one must recognize that cut-
ting down on gauge-underdetermination and narrowing one’s gauge equivalence class 
are two sides of the same coin. To do this, it is natural (but not necessary) to remain 
close to the original motivation: locality. In Sect. 7, I survey several precise formulations 
of a locality condition, such as Bell locality, local interaction Hamiltonians, separabil-
ity and signal locality. In Sect. 8, I review the reasoning that led Aharonov and Bohm 
to infer the reality of the potentials. I discuss how this can be read as narrowing down 
the ‘old’ Wide Equivalence Class of admitted gauge symmetries (  ↦ � ∶=  +  
such that ∇ ×  = 0 ) to the Narrow Equivalence Class (  ↦ � ∶=  + ∇ ), so as to 
admit some physical degrees of freedom of the potential in addition to those that give 
rise to  and  . The (modern) Narrow Equivalence Class is local in a sense, namely 
that the electron picks up a phase incrementally along its path. The kind of locality I 
then suggest we should seek is signal locality, similar to the locality exhibited by  and 
 , since they propagate with a finite velocity. With that knowledge, I suggest that one 
can go a step further and extend this narrowing of the gauge equivalence class: I argue 
in Sect. 9 that the ‘Lorenz Equivalence Class’ satisfies that desideratum.
The overall argument of the paper thus consists of there being several options on a 
spectrum of gauge equivalence classes, as shown in Figure 1—according to one’s com-
mitments to locality and reality, one can explore additional positions to those shown.
3  Aharonov–Bohm: Non‑locality and Gauge Potentials
Due to their prediction of the effect that came to carry their names, David Bohm 
and his PhD student Yakir Aharonov [16] argued that a “further interpretation of the 
potentials is needed in quantum mechanics.” Their solution, which was adopted by 
Fig. 1  A spectrum of equivalence relations on the potentials and corresponding philosophical positions 
with wider relations towards the right. On the far right, one has the fields view for which only  and  
are real. Everything to the left of this posits more physical degrees of freedom and is hence within the 
potentials view. The Narrow Equivalence Class, which is the one most often used in contemporary phys-
ics, encodes fewer gauge degrees of freedom—it coincides with the fields view in simply-connected spa-
cetimes. One can narrow this down further by additional constraints on the local gauge function  , such 
as my suggested Lorenz gauge. Fixing all degrees of freedom, for example in Coulomb gauge, would 
lead to Maudlin’s ‘One True Gauge’ potentials theory. For completeness: such a position would still 
involve a residual but trivial equivalence class, reflecting possible choices of units. The reader is invited 
to find additional positions
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many physicists, was to promote the potentials from mathematical fiction to some-
thing physical.3
As illustrated in Fig. 2, Aharonov and Bohm envisage the following experimental 
set-up, which originated as a thought experiment but was shortly afterwards experi-
mentally realized by Robert Chambers (who is mentioned in their original paper). A 
coherent electron beam is split and directed around a solenoid and brought together 
again in a region where interference can be detected at a screen. The solenoid can 
be imagined as an infinite tightly-wound coil (so that the current is strictly circular, 
without a perpendicular component), which in turn ensures, by the usual magneto-
static symmetry arguments, that the magnetic field is confined to inside the solenoid 
(in the direction perpendicular to the plane of the figure). The solenoid itself is then 
shielded, so that the wavefunction of the electrons is excluded from the region occu-
pied by the solenoid.
In a canonical formulation, external magnetic fields are coupled to the elec-
tron via the electromagnetic potential. The Hamiltonian for an electron of mass m, 
momentum  and charge q in an external magnetic field is
Fig. 2  Experimental set-up to show the AB interference effect with time-independent vector potential as 
a result of switching on the current through the solenoid. The usual two-slit interference pattern is trans-
lated upward by an amount Δx = −qBlΦ∕2ℏd . Figure reproduced from [21, p.7]
3 This effect had been semi-classically calculated by Ehrenberg and Siday in 1949 [17], and might there-
fore be called the Aharonov–Bohm–Ehrenberg–Siday effect. Aharonov and Bohm clearly stressed the 
metaphysical importance of this result, which seems to be the main reason why the phenomenon carries 
their name.
1 3
Foundations of Physics (2021) 51:48 Page 7 of 26 48
where  is stationary [18]. If the electron wavefunction in the absence of the mag-
netic field is given by 0() , the presence of the magnetic field forces us to add 
a phase to the electron wavefunction—the Dirac phase factor [19]—calculated by 
solving the time-independent Schrödinger equation,
where the phase factor is given by the line integral of the vector potential over some 
path in the region where the electron is allowed to move (that is, it can take any path 
outside the solenoid).4
Decomposing the wavefunction of the electron into a superposition of two parts, 
() = 1() + 2() , one describing the electron following a path 1 in the clock-
wise direction around the solenoid and the other the counter-clockwise path 2, the 
phase difference between these paths in the interference region is
which is a line integral over the closed path C defined by traversing path 1 and then, 
in reverse, path 2. The two phases picked up along the paths do not cancel, but add 
to give the loop integral because of the opposite orientations of the integrals of the 
two paths.
But what fixes the path of integration so that we can actually evaluate the inte-
gral? After all, a quantum particle can be regarded as taking all possible paths. This 
is rather subtle because the value of  is subject to a gauge condition. The approach 
is as follows. For some closed loop  , using the familiar but tailor-made gauge free-





(3.2)() = 0() exp
(
iq














ℏ ∮C  ⋅ d,
(3.4)∮ 
�
⋅ d = ∮ ( + ∇) ⋅ d = ∮  ⋅ d,
4 In the four-vector formalism one can accommodate the time-dependent version of the AB effect with 
the Dirac phase factor (q∕ℏ) ∮

Adx
 = (q∕ℏ) ∮

[ ⋅ d − dt] over some closed path  through space-
time. I will steer clear of using covariant notation to (i) keep the discussion accessible to the undergradu-
ate level, which it conceptually surely is, and (ii) to prevent the activation of already-possessed knowl-
edge of the experienced gauge-theorist, particularly the tendency to readily interpret only gauge-invariant 
quantities as physical without reconsidering which symmetry it is based on.
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where the second equality holds due to the identical vanishing of a gradient around a 





⋅ d = 0 vanishes.5 In 





⋅ d depends only on the initial 
position 1 and final position 2 , not on the path taken. The reason why I call this 
gauge freedom tailor-made is that it is specifically designed to make this integral 
vanish, making it narrower than a more general gauge symmetry  ↦ � =  +  
with ∇ ×  = 0 , as I will discuss in Sect. 5.
What this calculation implies is a shift in the interference pattern depending on 
the magnetic vector potential  . When the distance l between the screen and the slits 
is much larger than the size of the screen in the interference region (given by the 
position variable x), the usual two-slit interference pattern, ΔStwo slit∕ℏ = 2xd∕Bl 
(where B = h∕|| is the de Broglie wavelength of the electron and d is the separa-
tion between the slits), shifts upward (or downward, depending on the direction of 
the current) by an amount6
To identify Φ as the magnetic flux through the region that is enclosed by the loop C, 
one uses Stokes’ theorem to rewrite this phase shift in terms of the magnetic field  
through surface area S with the loop C as its boundary,
That we can write the loop integral in terms of the magnetic field is not a remarkable 
result by itself, since it is, after all, expected that magnetic fields influence elec-
trons’ behaviour. The remarkable fact is that the magnetic field is confined to the 
region inside the solenoid and is zero outside. The electrons experience a shift even 
though they never move through a region of non-zero magnetic field: but the shift 
still depends on the current.
Aharonov and Bohm argue that because “in a field-free multiply-connected 
region of space, the physical properties of the system still depend on the potentials,” 
we should promote the potentials from fiction to being physical:







 does not appear anywhere in the fundamen-
tal theory, but appears only as an approximation holding in the classical limit. 
















(3.6)∮C  ⋅ d = ∫ (∇ × ) ⋅ d = ∫  ⋅ d ∶= Φ.
5 To visualize this better, we can, following Binney and Skinner [20, Sec. 3.3.3], consider the form of 
the vector potential for an infinitely thin solenoid (at the origin and in the ẑ-direction) in cylindrical polar 
coordinates, so that  = Φ
2r2
(−y, x, 0) for r =
√
x2 + y2 and Φ the magnetic flux (cf. Eq. (3.6)). Now 
choose the gauge such that this vector field vanishes, namely ∇ = Φ
2r2
(y,−x, 0) , which is achieved by 
choosing  = − Φ
2
 for the polar angle  = arctan (y∕x).
6 The early experiments by Chambers and by Moellenstedt and Bayh did not involve slits. Also, Timothy 
Boyer has kindly pointed out to me that Figure 2 and my phrasing incorrectly suggests that the whole 
interference pattern is displaced sideways undisturbed, whereas in reality the double-slit interference pat-
tern changes, not the single-slit envelope [22]: an inaccuracy or lack of nuance that he traces back to the 
Feynman Lectures. Here, it is sufficient to understand the problem through Figure 2.
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mechanics, the fundamental physical entities are the potentials, while the fields 
are derived from them by differentiations [16, p.490].
The important point is that Aharonov and Bohm appeal to some kind of explanation 
of the AB phase using the tools at hand in the mathematical formalism of the theory. 
Even if one is in principle willing to allow a non-local influence of the B-field on the 
electron,7 the structure of that B-field says nothing about how this non-local influ-
ence would work. After all, the B-field satisfies the wave equation so that it propa-
gates at a finite speed c, so that it surely cannot be invoked as acting non-locally.8 
Hence, the (E,B)-theory puts no explanation of this phenomenon on the table.
Hence, the AB effect directly challenges the fields view. The predictions of the 
combination of classical (E,B)-theory and quantum-mechanical test particles fail, 
forcing a reconsideration in either one of these theories. One option would be to 
search for a non-local law in quantum mechanics, which at first sight sounds reason-
able in view of the violation of the Bell inequalities, as will be discussed in Sect. 7. 
The other option, which is widely adopted and will now be explored in more detail, 
is to follow Aharonov and Bohm’s advice in promoting the potentials to ‘fundamen-
tal ontology’.
4  Electrodynamics in Terms of Potentials
It makes a difference which parts of the mathematical formalism of a theory are seen 
as physical. Two theories that share the same formalism can differ in their assess-
ment of the physicality of part of that formalism. Those parts that are supposed to 
correspond (in some admittedly philosophically controversial way9) to entities in 
the actual world, I will call ‘fundamental ontology’: the physical building blocks 
according to the theory (I say ‘according to the theory’ to prevent the connotation of 
‘ultimate building blocks’, i.e., I take fundamentality as a relation between theories). 
Yet, regardless of the way the relation between theory and the world is fleshed out, 
it is clear that it is entirely possible—even the historical norm—that what parts of 
the formalism are considered to be physical becomes contested in times when a new 
theory is needed.
In electrostatics, the electric field can be interpreted as merely encoding the pro-
pensity of a test charge to accelerate under the (non-local) Coulomb force. In elec-
trodynamics, Maxwell’s equations do not deal directly in terms of forces, but with 
the fields and the source charges. Electrodynamical phenomena can be described by 
Maxwell’s equations, which, in vacuum, read: Gauss’ law, ∇ ⋅  = 0 ; Faraday’s law, 
7 Indeed, David Bohm himself would not be so bothered by non-local explanations in physics.
8 In the jargon I introduce in Sect. 7,  satisfies signal locality, which is here fulfilled by satisfying the 
wave equation (given that  is physical).
9 According to Quine, the ontology is given by the domain you quantify over [23]; closest to that in 
spirit is a primitive ontologist who postulates an explicit fundamental ontology together with axioms 
[24]; structural realists say that the ontology is provided by the mathematical structures used in the axi-
oms [25]. The language in this paper is naturalistically inclined: I will follow most physicists in labelling 
those objects that are supposed to be in the world as ‘physical’.
 Foundations of Physics (2021) 51:48
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∇ ×  = −∕t ; Gauss’ law for magnetism, ∇ ⋅  = 0 ; and the Maxwell-Ampère 
law, ∇ ×  = (1∕c2)∕t . These equations lead10 to electromagnetic waves with 
speed c, which can travel for millions of years in the absence of any nearby charges. 
These fields carry energy and momentum, as expressed by the Poynting vector 
 ∝  ×  , which gives the energy flux of an electromagnetic wave. This leads one 
to interpret the electric and magnetic fields as fundamental ontology, as opposed to 
a mere propensity of a test charge to accelerate when subject to the Coulomb force. 
This interpretive move is made in every course on electrodynamics. Besides, here I 
should mention the unification of optics and electromagnetism—and it is this expla-
nation that convinces the student that there is something more to the vector fields  
and  than meets the eye: light.
We can attempt a similar step to favour the (  , A)-theory over the (E,B)-theory. 
An alternative formulation in terms of the scalar potential  and vector potential  
adds some extra structure to the fields, from which the field can be obtained via the 
equations
and
These definitions are chosen such that Gauss’ law of magnetism and Faraday’s law 
are trivially satisfied. With these definitions, the two dynamical equations (the time-
derivatives in Faraday’s law and the Maxwell-Ampère’s law encode the evolution of 
the fields) become
and (using the same vector identity as in footnote 10)
The form is less neat than in the (E,B)-theory, but this shows that a formulation in 
terms of potentials is possible without making reference to the electric and magnetic 
fields at all.
Both formulations are empirically equivalent since their predictions—at least in 
the known domains that have been probed—will not depend on any of the ‘extra’ 
structure introduced by the definitions Eqs. (4.1)-(4.2). The reason is that the values 
of the electric and magnetic fields we can measure, and the trajectories of charged 
particles in these fields as determined by the Lorentz force law, remain the same 
regardless of the choice between the (E,B)- or ( ,A)-theories.























10 Taking the curl of Faraday’s law, using the vector identity ∇ × (∇ × ) = ∇(∇ ⋅ ) − ∇2 , invoking the 
constraint that is Gauss’ law and using the Maxwell-Ampère law.
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Here is a clear case of what philosophers call ‘underdetermination of theory by 
data’. So the following position can be maintained: an eccentric can claim that we 
should postulate the potentials  and  as directly related to the ‘real’ things in the 
world, instead of the electric and magnetic fields. That position is the most straight-
forward version of the potentials view. Note that the (E,B)-theory and the ( ,A)-the-
ory are regarded as two different theories because they have different fundamental 
ontologies. In the real world, including special circumstances in the lab, we see the 
potentials  and  just as indirectly as the fields  and  , although we might intui-
tively feel more comfortable with the latter.
On merely empirical grounds the case must remain undecided as long as one can-
not give an independent reason to take the potentials seriously as real things. But the 
Aharonov–Bohm effect provides precisely such an independent reason, since the ( 
,A)-theory provides local explanations of the AB phase shift in Eq. (3.5), whereas 
the (E,B) theory cannot give such an explanation. This is why many endorse the 
potentials view. In the next section I will argue that, if one is to take the potentials 
view, then further steps have to be considered in order to have a well-defined the-
ory—a fact that often goes unmentioned.
5  ‘Gauge‑Underdetermination’ and Equivalence Classes
Gauge symmetry is usually formalized by the transformations
and
where (, t) is an arbitrary scalar function, depending on both space and time coor-
dinates. The fields  and  are left unchanged regardless of the function  , thanks 
to the definitions (4.1) and (4.2). Hence, if one is only interested in  and  , one can 
choose a  that simplifies the derivation of a solution to a given physical problem. In 
principle, an infinity of gauges is possible, as the scalar function  is arbitrary.
For example, Maxwell’s equations in the potentials formulation can be given a 
simpler form by choosing the Coulomb gauge (often used in magnetostatics),
In other words, the gauge parameter  is constrained by ∇2 = 0 , which has a 
unique solution and is therefore a complete gauge-fix. Gauss’ law (4.3) and the Max-
well-Ampère law (4.4) then become




(5.2) ↦ � ∶=  + ∇ ,
(5.3)∇ ⋅  = 0.
(5.4)∇2 =0,
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Eq.  (5.4) is simply the Laplace equation, but the Maxwell-Ampère law has mixed 
space- and time-derivatives.
Alternatively, if one were to choose the Lorenz gauge,11 it precisely cancels that 
mixed term, by requiring
In other words, the gauge parameter  is constrained by ∇2 = c−22∕t2 , which 
is an incomplete gauge condition, as there is residual freedom in the form of a sca-
lar wave (one can choose a further fix that leaves no residual freedom, for exam-
ple by setting  = 0 , which is the so-called temporal gauge). In the Lorenz gauge, 
Eqs. (4.3) and (4.4) reduce to
and
resulting in the wave equation for both the vector and scalar potentials. There is also 
a residual gauge degree of freedom, which can be fixed by an initial condition that 
specifies  at spatial infinity—which I discuss further in Sect. 9.
Equations (5.1)-(5.2) define an equivalence class. Thus it is said that any choice 
of  will lead to the same physics. But one has to first agree on what the physics is. 
In this case, the usual argument is that this equivalence class leaves the electric and 
magnetic fields invariant. This is of course true. Yet, anticipating Sect. 8 and turn-
ing to what I called (just below Eq. (3.4)) the tailor-made gauge symmetry, there is, 
in fact, a wider equivalence class one can consider which leaves the fields invariant. 
Namely, for any  and C0 such that ∇ ×  = 0 and ∇C0 = ∕t , one transforms
and
This defines an equivalence class of potentials, related to each other by the choice 
of gauge vector  and gauge scalar C0 . This class is wider than the class defined by 
Eqs. (5.1)-(5.2), where the gauge freedom is given only by the possible choices of 
the scalar  . There is more freedom in the gauge vector  than in the gauge scalar 

























(5.9) ↦ � ∶=  − C0,
(5.10) ↦ � ∶=  + .
11 Not Lorentz, although often this choice of gauge is connected to Hendrik Antoon Lorentz instead of 
Ludvig Lorenz: a confusion well documented by van Bladel [26].
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Eq. (4.2) due to the imposed requirement that the rotation of  vanishes and for Eq. 
(4.1) because the rotation of a gradient vanishes identically).
Therefore, I will speak of the Wide Equivalence Class defined by (5.9)-(5.10) and 
the Narrow Equivalence Class defined by (5.1)-(5.2). Agreed: there is no difference 
between the two classes in a simply-connected space. Yet there are no local facts that 
allow us to figure out how our space is connected. It is precisely the legacy of Aha-
ronov and Bohm, whose thought experiment introduces a multiply-connected space 
(the solenoid ‘punctures’ the space, as it were, introducing a conical singularity), 
that one now works with the Narrow Equivalence Class, which provides additional 
degrees of freedom that can in some sense account for the AB phase shift. Section 8 
is devoted to what sense this is. This relates to the goal of this paper: to shed light on 
the path of narrowing this class down even further to obtain a clear local ontology.
Back to the naive potentials view: the “eccentric” who wants to hold on to regard-
ing  and  as completely real cannot claim that a choice of gauge ‘does not change 
the physics’. For her, the potentials are the physics and, hence, every different  cor-
responds to a different theory. Each choice of  leaves the fields  and  unchanged; 
and hence these fields underdetermine the theory, on the potentials view. However, 
down this path one quickly encounters a straightforward problem. There is no inde-
pendent way to determine the value of  , since it can no longer be seen as simply 
a pragmatic tool for the purposes of calculation. In other words, the predictions are 
ambiguous; the equations of motion will have non-unique solutions and one is left 
with an indeterministic theory.
On the potentials view, determinism manifestly fails as long as  is not fixed. For 
one can make an argument analogous to the ‘hole argument’ that exploits diffeomor-
phisms in general relativity [27]. Suppose the fields view and the potentials view are 
related by a time-dependent gauge transformation that is the identity up to a time 
t. Hence, they agree up to t, but diverge afterwards. If different values of  lead to 
different facts about the real world—which the fields view does not claim but the 
potentials view does—this amounts to indeterminism. For there are multiple ways 
that  and  can evolve in time.
The ( ,A)-theorist should not want to endorse such indeterminism—certainly not 
in response to an eminently predictable phenomenon such as the AB effect—since 
the theory would be unable to make definite predictions (although it could restrict 
the predictions to merely  and  ). Not even the option to assign probabilistic 
weights to the alternatives, that is used in textbook quantum mechanics, is available 
to her. Therefore, the ( ,A)-theorist should embrace that Eqs. (5.1) and (5.2) repre-
sent a set of theories, parametrized by  . Hence, the flipside of gauge-indeterminism 
is what I call ‘gauge-underdetermination’. But this underdetermination is only prob-
lematic if one leaves  unfixed.
The conclusion then seems unavoidable. If one claims that the potentials are 
completely physical, the potentials view leads to indeterminism: the exact same 
values of  and  can be predicted using different gauges which correspond to 
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different futures of  and  given fixed initial conditions. The way to solve this 
and recover the ability to make unique predictions is to regard only one of the 
gauge choices as genuinely physical. Maudlin12 has called this the ‘One True 
Gauge’ principle [28]. Hence, it is not arbitrary to choose between the Lorenz, 
the Coulomb or some other gauge. Different physical facts corresponds to dif-
ferent choices of gauge. Once a unique choice has been made and the theory 
accepted, the other gauge choices can be considered as mathematically conveni-
ent fictions, as tools for making calculations suited to different problems. That is 
why the name ‘(,A)-theory’ is not sufficient and should really be seen as a col-
lection of ‘(,A)-theories’, of which, for example, the Coulomb gauge potentials 
theory, ( ,A)CG-theory, and the Lorenz gauge potentials theory, ( ,A)LG-theory, 
are members.
We need not be so ambitious, however, as to consider all degrees of freedom 
encoded in  and  physical. One can define gauge equivalence classes whose mem-
bers all match each other on the degrees of freedom that one considers physical. The 
above ‘collection’ of ( ,A)-theories thus corresponds to the Narrow Equivalence 
Class. Depending on one’s criteria, one would narrow this equivalence class down 
further, which is equivalent to adding more constraints, i.e., shrinking the space of 
functions for .
In Sect.  7, I present candidates for trimming down gauge-underdetermination 
in the form of Bell locality and signal locality. In Sect. 8, I discuss Aharonov and 
Bohm’s locality concept and modern views of the local explanation that can be 
given in terms of the equivalence class defined by Eqs. (5.1)-(5.2). This class is suit-
able to provide an explanation in terms of local interactions, but is deemed insuf-
ficiently suited to provide a signal-local explanation of the AB effect in terms of a 
sharp ontology. Thus, I will formulate desiderata that can lead to a further narrow-
ing. In Sect. 9, I will suggest that picking the Lorenz gauge as such a constraint will 
narrow the gauge equivalence class down in such a way that one has a signal-local 
explanation of the AB effect in terms of travelling  and  potential fields, just as 
one has travelling  and  fields in the traditional Maxwell theory. But before that, 
I discuss in the next section how and why the considerations that go into choosing a 
gauge equivalence class, and in particular the related problem of gauge-underdeter-
mination, are so often not engaged with in the scientific literature.
6  Gauge‑Underdetermination in the Scientific Literature
The fact that underdetermination automatically arises in the potentials view is too 
often unacknowledged. In this section, I will criticise the presentations of several 
widely-read authors. In general, the issue is that even though these authors commit 
to the potentials being real, they are still considered as gauge fields where the gauge 
12 Tim Maudlin, incidentally, does not defend this position as his personal solution to the ontological 
problems posed by the AB effect. The position originated in a response to Healey’s ‘mid-way’ position 
about the reality of the potentials.
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transformation remains as free a tool as in the fields view. This is having your cake 
and eating it too—using the potentials view for an explanation of the AB effect and 
the fields view to get out of gauge-underdetermination.
Norsen devotes a section of his recent (important) book to questions about reality 
and locality similar to those in this paper. He considers the possibility of accepting 
the electrodynamic potentials as physically real [29, p.21]. Then he alludes to Bell’s 
argument (cf Sect. 7) that the scalar potential is non-local in the Coulomb gauge and 
argues, like Bell, that this is not a problem because it is “bound up in some way with 
human knowledge or conventions.”
But what is bound up with human knowledge or convention? If it is the poten-
tials, then we are simply rejecting the premise that the potentials are real. Hence it 
is more likely that Norsen means the gauge choice. But if one regards the potentials 
as physically real, the gauge choice can no longer be considered a convention, since 
every ‘choice’ leads to a different description of the state of affairs in nature.
Another instance is found in the introduction to gauge theories by Moriyasu, who 
states that
[t]he Aharonov–Bohm effect clearly contradicted the accepted notion that 
only the electric and magnetic fields could produce observable effects. 
More important, it became evident that the potential had to be treated as 
a physical field that was also directly observable. The alternative would be 
to believe that the phase shift is produced by the magnetic field “acting at a 
distance” in direct conflict with relativity [30, p.21].
But the precise way in which the magnetic field could act at a distance is not 
fleshed out. More importantly, there is no mention in the book about the conse-
quential underdetermination that arises from taking the potentials as the funda-
mental ontology; at the same time, the author speaks of making different gauge 
choices as if the fields view was adhered to.
In his Lecture 9, Feynman defined locality as an intrinsic part of (real) fields: 
“a field is ‘real’ if it is what must be specified at the position of the particle in 
order to get the motion” [31]. He further made the sociological observation that 
this conclusion had become consensus, since “E and B are slowly disappearing 
from the modern expression of physical laws; they are being replaced by A and 
 .” The latter was surely correct at the time and has become even more so today, 
if only due to the canonical formulation inserting the potentials into Schröding-
er’s equation. Nevertheless, also in the Feynman lectures, there is no mention of 
the problem of gauge-underdetermination that arises from taking the potentials 
as physical, though different gauge choices are being used. Hence it is not at all 
clear what is meant be ‘real’ here.
Let us briefly survey Healey’s positive account of the AB effect, which is 
called the holonomies view [6] (also see Belot [32] and Wu and Yang [33]). In 
addition to assigning vectors such as  and  to points in space, this view assigns 
complex numbers—called holonomies—to closed curves in space. These holono-
mies are gauge-invariant complex numbers of unit modulus:
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The holonomies (6.1) are gauge-invariant for the same reason that Eq. (3.4) is 
gauge-invariant, using the familiar but tailor-made gauge symmetry of the Narrow 
Equivalence Class. The loop integrals of the potentials are promoted to fundamental 
ontology [6, section 4.4]. There are several costs to this approach. Notably, it thus 
seems one cannot write down the equations of motion in terms of the holonomies. 
Also, even though the holonomies act locally, they lead to a non-local theory in the 
sense that it is non-separable: determining the state in a given region involves the 
value of h() for every possible loop. It is non-separable in the sense that the state 
of a region is not fully determined by the conjunction of states on all its subregions 
(which is the kind of non-locality or ‘non-separability’ that Einstein objected to 
[34]: cf. Sect. 7).
Healey dismisses the potentials view by claiming that “there is reason to 
doubt that the magnetic vector potential is a physically real field,” since “  is 
not gauge-invariant” [35, p.22]. This kind of gauge-invariance is Healey’s desid-
eratum. But from this it does not follow that one should doubt the physicality of 
 . He argues that, since one can transform away part of the vector potential in 
the region outside of the solenoid, for example gauging it to zero at path 1 of the 
electron beam (cf, footnote 5), the effect should not derive from  itself. Healey 
specifically suggests that
the potential is defined only up to a gauge-transformation, and for any con-
tinuous path from source to screen that does not enclose the solenoid there 
is a gauge-transformation that equates the value of  at every point on that 
path when a current is flowing to its value when no current is flowing. The 
shift interference pattern cannot therefore be produced by a direct interaction 
between individual electrons following such continuous paths and the mag-
netic vector potential  outside the solenoid. Accepting the physical reality of 
the vector potential fails to render the AB effect local: while denying its physi-
cal reality leaves one without any local explanation of the effect [35, p.22].
Here, Healey seems to be dismissing the potentials view as a sleight of hand—deny-
ing it from the start. Healey seems to be saying that there is always a gauge choice in 
which the explanation cannot be given in terms of a local effect of the vector poten-
tial. Healey’s point of view, then, is that if  and  are real then they should be real 
in all gauges. But this prompts the question why we use the gauge symmetries that 
we use.
One need not follow Healey in ignoring the possibility of additional physical 
degrees of freedom of the Narrow Equivalence Class. It is unproblematic to say 
that only gauge-invariant quantities can be considered physical, but this depends 
on which definition of the gauge equivalence class one takes, for example the 
Wide Equivalence Class (  ↦ � ∶=  +  such that ∇ ×  = 0 ) or the Narrow 
Equivalence Class (  ↦ � ∶=  + ∇ ), or even a narrower equivalence class 
(6.1)h() = exp
[
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(  ↦ � ∶=  + ∇ plus a further constraint). In addition to that, on the potentials 
view, there is in fact a local explanation of the AB phase shift using a narrower 
equivalence class. I discuss this in Sects. 7 and 8, and in Sect. 9 I argue for a specific 
narrower ‘Lorenz Equivalence class’, where the AB phase shift can be explained “by 
a direct interaction between individual electrons following such continuous paths 
and the magnetic vector potential  outside the solenoid.”
A final topic that, I suggest, could be emphasized more strongly in the literature 
is how the potentials view combines with quantum mechanics. Indeed, there are 
important constraints on the particular quantum theory one can adhere to, if one 
simultaneously adopts the potentials view (depending on the version of the poten-
tials view that one is considering).
The choice between quantum theories turns, in part, on whether to include a pre-
ferred foliation in a particular quantum theory. That is, if the collapse of the wave-
function is a physically real process, then presumably it picks out some preferred 
foliation of the spacetime, namely the hyperplane in which the state vector pro-
jects.13 In such a case, one might pursue the strategy of taking a non-local gauge 
potential theory as real and aligning the non-local foliation of that gauge theory to 
the foliation suggested by one’s quantum theory. This would, I believe, be a good 
strategy for reconciling particular collapse theories such as GRW theory with the 
potentials view. One can also consider the Coulomb gauge, which both picks out a 
relativistic structure, as seen in Eq. (5.5), and a preferred foliation, as we have rec-
ognized through Eq. (5.4). Following Maudlin’s suggestion, this spacetime structure 
serves well to implement Bohmian mechanics [37, p.20].
7  Desiderata: Bell Locality and Signal Locality
One reason why gauge-underdetermination is so often only briefly discussed, is that 
it is not straightforward which gauge should be preferred. As with every occurrence 
of underdetermination one needs additional principles if one wants to cut down on 
possibilities. But on what criterion should the gauge be fixed? I propose that, faced 
with the original motivation of formulating a local explanation of the AB effect, the 
choice should be made on the same grounds.
Yet clearly locality is itself a vague concept, with several uses, and these uses in 
turn tend to be vague. Einstein was concerned with the localization of physical facts: 
what we would now call separability or anti-holism [34]. This still allows for instan-
taneous action at a distance. The denial of action at a distance gives one the stronger 
notion of signal locality. I deem signal locality to be successful for our purposes and 
will discuss it below. First, however, I discuss the more precise notion of a Bell local 
theory, which seems to be the most promising version. Nevertheless, I will come to 
13 One should, however, be careful before equating the apparent non-locality that derives from violations 
of the Bell inequalities with the apparent non-locality that we have seen in the AB effect above. One can 
debate whether to begin the inquiry with analogies to violations of the Bell inequalities or the interpreta-
tion of gauge freedom. The former position is defended by Healey [35] [36] and the latter by Maudlin 
[28].
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the conclusion that Bell locality is generally not helpful. Only for some complete 
gauge choices can we evaluate it.
John Bell regarded gauge choices, as (E,B)-theorists do, as conventions. His 
famous example [38, p.219] is that of British sovereignty: “when the Queen of 
England dies in London, the Prince of Wales becomes instantaneously King.” But 
nobody is particularly bothered by this kind of non-locality, since the property of 
being the British sovereign is not a local beable, nor any kind of beable: it is a con-
vention. In this Pickwickian sense, conventions can indeed travel faster than light. In 
his 1976 paper on local beables, Bell writes
In Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, for example, the fields E and [B] are 
‘physical’ (beables, we will say) but the potentials A and  are ‘non-physical’. 
Because of gauge invariance the same physical situation can be described by 
very different potentials. It does not matter that in Coulomb gauge the scalar 
potential propagates with infinite velocity [see Eq. (5.4)]. It is not really sup-
posed to be there. It is just a mathematical convenience [39, p.54].”
On the potentials view, however,  and  are supposed to really be there. In that 
case, it is not so straightforward to evaluate whether the ( ,A)-theory is local in 
the sense Bell was concerned with—to be explicated below. Different gauge choices 
lead to different locality considerations, so that gauge choices lead to conceptu-
ally different theories. Only in the context of a single clearly defined theory can we 
evaluate Bell locality. When there is gauge-underdetermination, the choice of gauge 
(partially) specifies what the supposed ontology (i.e., Bell’s local beables) of the 
theory are.
So let us define the concept of Bell locality. Consider two spatially separated 
regions, region 1 and region 2, and the events in their respective past light cones. 
Then consider a third region, region 3, confined to the past light cone of region 1, 
but completely excluded from the past light cone of region 2, as depicted in Fig. 3. 
The idea is that a theory is ‘Bell local’ if and only if events in 2 are irrelevant for 
predictions about events in 1 given that one has a full specification of what happens 
in region 3. Mathematically, the conditional probability that an event E1 in region 1 
occurs given the set of events C3 in region 3 should be equal to the conditional prob-
ability that the same event E1 occurs given the same C3 and also any additional event 
E2 in region 2:
Fig. 3  “Full specification of what happens in 3 makes events in 2 irrelevant for predictions about 1 in a 
locally causal theory.” Figure from [38, p.225]
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Of course, E1 and E2 might still be correlated events. After all, their respective past 
light cones do have an overlapping region which can contain an event that is a com-
mon causal influence on the two events. There can also be some indirect influence 
of the causes of E1 overlapping with the causes of E2 . But the point is that in a Bell 
local theory any such information that event E2 might reveal about event E1 is already 
contained in C3 : so given C3 , any information about whether E2 occurs is redundant.14
Note further that Bell locality is a property at the level of the theory and does not 
directly mention events in reality. To link the theory to the things in the world, Bell 
introduces [38, p.219] the notion of beables: the “beables of the theory are those 
entities in it which are, at least tentatively, to be taken seriously, as corresponding 
to something real.” Hence, beables are theoretical entities that can be directly linked 
to something in the world, depending on how one fleshes this out (cf. footnote 9). 
Further, beables are local beables if they can be confined to some finite spacetime 
region. One can see that Bell locality presupposes separability.
To further examine the usefulness of Bell locality in the context of the AB effect, 
one should realize that quantum mechanics itself is Bell non-local, due to the viola-
tions of the Bell inequalities. As mentioned earlier in this section, one can compare 
the relation between different senses of non-locality in the AB experiment and the 
experimental tests of the Bell inequalities. How severe Bell non-locality really is 
remains widely contested, especially concerning whether parameter independence 
or outcome independence is violated, which depends on making Bell’s work even 
more precise [40]. Furthermore, to evaluate the Bell locality of a theory, we presup-
pose a measurement-problem-free theory where the ontological commitments are 
reasonably clear. That is, we cannot see at the phenomenological level if outcome 
independence or parameter independence is violated, since we inevitably run into 
the measurement problem when we consider ‘outcomes’ [41]. Yet, this leads us 
astray in our present context. In this present context the goal is to formulate desid-
erata in terms of locality considerations. That is, we attempt to use locality as a 
criterion for theory choice in a gauge-underdetermined situation so as narrow down 
the class of admitted gauge degrees of freedom. In any case, I maintain that matters 
are worsened if there is an additional beable in the theory that violates Eq. (7.1). For 
example, a Coulomb gauge potentials theory would violate it through direct action 
at a distance (see below).
The electric and magnetic fields are defined in four-dimensional spacetime and 
satisfy the wave equation, Eq.  (7.2), which automatically confines the propagation 
of causal influences to the light cones. Since the theory is deterministic, C3 uniquely 
determines event E1 , since it is in the future domain of dependence Σ(C3) of region 
C3 : a sufficient set of relevant initial conditions for E1 lie in region 3 so that the equa-
tions of motion of all the beables involved in E1 have a unique solution. On the fields 
(7.1)P[E1|C3] = P[E1|C3, E2].
14 To simplify terminology, I use the property ‘Bell local’ as synonymous with ‘locally causal’, inter-
preting Eq. (7.1) as C3 ‘completely screens off E1 from events in E2’.
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view (i.e., taking the electric and magnetic fields as physical), the (E,B)-theory is 
Bell local and the E and B fields are local beables.
Yet, even though the (E,B)-theory is Bell local, it is unable to give a local expla-
nation of the AB phase shift. It would therefore be natural to evaluate the Bell local-
ity of the potentials view in the context of the AB effect. However, the experimental 
set-up is not easily translated into the language of Eq. (7.1). In the AB experiment 
the electron beam comes arbitrarily close to the solenoid, so that two putative events 
E1 and E2 involving the electron cannot be spacelike separated without destroying 
the AB phase shift. This is because the electrons need to form a closed loop and 
the electrons are confined to the light cone. In short: the Aharonov–Bohm set-up 
involves a single system, making Bell locality hard to apply. Therefore, Bell locality 
will not lend itself as a criterion to pick out some local gauge choice. One can only 
take a particular potentials theory, put it into the language of Eq. (7.1), and consider 
if there are violations of Bell locality.
The sense of locality that, I will argue, can tackle gauge-underdetermination and 
provide a local picture of the AB effect is that of signal locality. This is what one 
usually understands by the concept ‘locality’: it means that the causal influences that 
bodies exert on one another propagate at some finite speed. So the theory is to treat 
causal influences as propagating at a finite speed through (disjoint regions of) space-
time. One imagines ‘messengers’ that take some time to travel from one event to the 
other in order to ‘tell’ the actors there how they should react. If that travelling speed 
is infinite, one speaks of ‘action at a distance’.
Electric and magnetic fields satisfy signal locality. Taking the the curl of both 
Faraday’s law and the Maxwell-Ampère law, one derives that the electric and mag-
netic fields both satisfy the wave equation:
and likewise for the B-field. The solutions are waves moving at speeds c, such that 
electromagnetic signals travel with a finite velocity.15
In the Coulomb gauge—as we have seen in Eq. (5.4) and in Bell’s words above—
the scalar potential satisfies the Laplace equation, which is a non-local equation also 
satisfied by the Newtonian gravitational potential. One way to see this is to take the 
limit c → ∞ in the wave equation so that it reduces to Laplace’s equation. Hence, 
signal locality is violated.
If we now briefly return to the property of Bell locality, we recognize that only 
now that a complete gauge is fixed, viz. the Coulomb gauge, one is in a position 






15 This is also the case when sources are included. Then, the wave equations acquire an inhomogeneous 
part, which can be solved by the Green’s function method. A point charge (or current) at position ′ con-
sidered only at one point in time ( t� = 0 ) gives rise to an electric (or magnetic) field, evolving forward in 
time, (, t) = −𝛿
(
t − | − �|∕c
)
∕4𝜋| − �|r̂ , with the delta distribution (x) and radial unit vector r̂ . 
It is interpreted as a wavefront that propagates spherically outwards, reaching all the positions  at times 
t = ∕c . A real source is represented by the superposition of such charges (currents) in space and time.
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since the beables at E1 are not fully specified by region C3 and can be spacelike 
influenced by E2 from outside the past light cone. Hence, as the scalar potential is 
a beable in this theory, the Coulomb gauge potentials theory ( ,)CG violates Bell 
locality in quite a crude way; indeed, exactly as crudely as Newtonian gravitational 
theory does.
Alternatively, in the Lorenz gauge potentials theory ( ,A)LG , both the scalar 
potential  and the vector potential  satisfy the wave equation and propagate with 
velocity c, as exhibited by Eqs. (5.7)-(5.8). Hence, in the Lorenz gauge, signal local-
ity is satisfied, as can be motivated by Fig. 4. So here is a local explanation that—
unlike the (E,B)-theory—has the ability to explain the AB phase shift locally. The 
next two concluding sections develop this theme.
Fig. 4  A sketch of the AB effect. The vector potential  , in the Lorenz gauge potentials theory ( ,A)LG , 
propagates outward at speed c after the current has been switched on (instantaneously) at t
1
 , while the 
magnetic field  is confined to the region occupied by the solenoid at all times. An electron wave-packet 
is emitted at t
0
 and is steered by external potentials around the solenoid both into the plane of the figure 
or away from the reader and out of the plane of the figure or towards the reader. For simplicity, the slits 
and surface of the screen are not drawn, but all possible paths of the electron must be imagined. If one 
takes the vector potential in the Lorenz gauge as fundamental ontology, then there is a signal-local expla-
nation of the phase shift (while there is none using the Wide or Narrow Equivalence Class). The result-
ing gauge equivalence class, here dubbed the Lorenz Equivalence Class, has a residual gauge symmetry 
in the form of a scalar wave, i.e.,  satisfying ∇2 = c−22∕t2 . This narrows down the usual equiva-
lence class  ↦ � ∶=  + ∇ significantly
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8  Local Interaction and Narrowing Equivalence Classes
Ahanorov and Bohm speak of the apparent non-locality of their experiment as follows.
Of course, our discussion does not bring into question the gauge invariance of 
the theory. But it does show that in a theory involving only local interactions 
(e.g., Schrodinger’s or Dirac’s equation, and current quantum-mechanical field 
theories), the potentials must, in certain cases, be considered as physically effec-
tive, even when there are no fields acting on the charged particles [16, p.490].
Hence they consider the results inexplicable in terms of local interactions, as long 
as the potentials remain interpreted as mathematical fictions. For the behaviour of 
the quantum probe would be influenced by the presence of  inside the solenoid, 
although  vanishes at every point in space outside the solenoid at every time that 
the probe is present at those spatial points.
Aharonov and Bohm argue for locality by noting that “according to our cur-
rent relativistic notions, all fields must interact only locally [16, p.490].” As their 
paper pre-dates Bell’s formulation of locality, and they do not explicate what they 
mean by locality, it is not clear if Aharonov and Bohm have something like local 
beables in mind. It is not even clear if they have signal locality in mind, although 
they can certainly be read that way. At the very least, their notion of locality 
seems more in line with the idea that a theory is local when given in terms of 
equations of motion where the interactions only take place when the coordinates 
of the interacting systems coincide. Call this local interactions.
Coming to what was promised at the end of Sect. 5, one can read Aharonov and 
Bohm conservatively: as rejecting the Wide Equivalence Class that leaves only the  
and  fields invariant, namely Eqs. (5.9)-(5.10), repeated here as  ↦ � ∶=  +  
and  ↦ � ∶=  − C0, such that ∇ ×  = 0 and ∇C0 = ∕t . One can now refor-
mulate Aharonov and Bohm’s legacy: the traditional fields view that used the Wide 
Equivalence Class to encode the physical states of affairs in the world is inadequate 
because the class is too wide. For, in general, two elements of such a class differ in 
their physics, as is revealed by the shifted interference patterns exhibited by prob-
ing the field around the solenoid. The Narrower Equivalence Class joins these ele-
ments together. The ‘puncture’ in space that is the solenoid, introduces a multiply-
connected space and the difference brought about by this non-trivial topology can be 
probed by a suitable quantum particle.16 In other words, on a non-trivial topology 
the Narrow Equivalence Class is not the same as an electric and magnetic fields. The 
former has additional degrees of freedom, and these are the ones that account for the 
AB effect in terms of local interactions of the fields.17
16 The electron in the AB experiment is described by a quantum wave function. In some sense, however, 
this is only accidental. If one had used a classical, not a quantum, probe, an effect by the potential on the 
probe would still be there, but there might not be such a straightforward way to observe that effect. In 
addition—even though this does not demonstrate that the quantity is classical—note that computing the 
AB phase shift does not involve any loop integrals. See also Chapter 8 of Neil Dewar’s forthcoming book 
[42] and Henrique Gomes [43, p.19].
17 Much more can be said about the specific considerations of Bohm and Aharonov (cf.  the ‘Vaidman-
ACR’-debate in footnote 2 and references there).
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As I have stressed, there are different senses of locality. Even someone seeking 
a local explanation in a strong sense must admit that a space such as the Moebius 
strip can have global features that are not caught by the description of any local 
patch. Hence, locally you cannot say if the space is simply-connected or multiply-
connected. On the other hand, everybody must accept that the value of a line inte-
gral such as ∮

 ⋅ d changes incrementally as the endpoint varies. So, for the AB 
effect, anybody seeking a local explanation must respect such constraints. Yet, one 
might wonder what happened to the signal locality that we remember from the fields 
view, namely that  and  propagate as waves with speed c. Are we forced to give 
this up or can we have it on top of the above notion of local interaction? In other 
words, what does a signal-local explanation of the AB effect look like?
9  A Suggestion: The Lorenz Equivalence Class
In the final paragraph of Sect.  7, I pointed out that the Lorenz gauge potentials 
theory ( ,A)LG satisfies signal locality. It does so because in the Lorenz gauge the 
equations of motion of  and  satisfy the wave equation (5.7)-(5.8) with propaga-
tion speed c. Hence, if we narrow the equivalence class further by using the Lorenz 
gauge condition, the potentials can be interpreted as travelling waves, analogous to 
the travelling of  and  . Then, some degrees of freedom of the potentials—in addi-
tion to those giving rise to  and —travel outward from the solenoid to the elec-
tron. Thus, this ( ,A)LG-theory opens the door to a signal-local explanation of the 
AB phase shift, as illustrated in Fig. 4.
My proposal is, accordingly, to take the even narrower gauge equivalence class 
than the Narrow Equivalence Class by adding the constraint on the gauge function 
(, t) in the form of the Lorenz gauge condition (5.6). This constraint of the last 
line can be readily calculated by performing a gauge transformation (5.1)-(5.2) of 
the condition (5.6). It turns out that there is a residual freedom in which  itself 
obeys the wave equation.18 The Lorenz Equivalence Class is then
On this view, the ‘true’ gauge degrees of freedom are the ones that leave the scalar 
wave solution intact. This scalar wave solution is a result of the Lorenz gauge-fix 
being incomplete or partial. The remaining freedom describes how the potentials 
(9.1)











18 Alternatively, using the gauge freedom of the Wide Equivalence Class (5.9)-(5.10) returns four wave 
equations, ∇2C0 = c−22C0∕t2 and ∇2 = c−22∕t2 , still subject to ∕t = ∇C0 . However, this 
Wide Equivalence Class + Lorenz gauge condition is not sufficient to make the line integral (3.4) inde-
pendent of the path, which is what I have in Sect. 8 called Aharonov and Bohm’s legacy.
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behave far away, i.e. towards spatial infinity. This can be fixed by initial conditions; 
but, for all I have argued here, those initial conditions seem as if they cannot be 
determined empirically.
Let us return to the spectrum in Figure 1. We can now recognize that the Lor-
enz Equivalence Class is quite far to the left within the potentials view, but there is 
still the residual gauge freedom resulting from the partial gauge-fix, which we can 
safely regard as mathematical fiction. The Coulomb gauge condition (5.3) is a com-
plete gauge-fix, as it would result in the Laplace equation for the gauge function, 
∇2 = 0 , which—for given boundary conditions that one can take to be given by the 
experiment—has a unique solution. Another oft-used way to achieve this is the Lor-
enz gauge plus the temporal gauge  = 0 . Were one to gauge-fix completely along 
such routes, the resulting philosophical position is the One True Gauge principle, 
which can be seen as a gauge equivalence class with one member.
To be precise, however, one leaves room for the trivial gauge equivalence class, 
which consists of transformations of the unit one expresses the potentials in, call it 
the ‘Singleton Set’. Although this issue is hardly ever discussed in connection with 
the AB effect and gauge theories—and rightly so, since this variety is conceptually 
straightforward—nevertheless it means that until one chooses units, even a complete 
gauge-fixing yields equivalence classes each of which has many elements, corre-
sponding to the various possible units that one might choose to adopt. In the fields 
view, there is the same freedom to change the units of  and  , indicating that also 
the electric and magnetic field are not free from human choice.
10  Conclusion
Aharonov and Bohm showed us that there is good reason to take the electromag-
netic potentials seriously as part of the fundamental ontology of electrodynamics. 
One consequence of their work was that the Narrow Equivalence Class has become 
standard in contemporary textbooks, leading to some physical degrees of freedom 
in the potentials over and above those that give rise to  and  . The reality of the 
gauge potential demands careful treatment of one’s commitment to the gauge sym-
metry of the theory. Naively taking the potentials as ‘real’ immediately runs into 
an indeterminism of the equations of motion of the potentials and hence a group 
of rival theories between which one cannot choose on empirical grounds: gauge-
underdetermination. This is a partial commitment: one cannot have the reality of 
the potential (having the cake) while also regarding gauge-fixing as arbitrary (eating 
it too). Such a move does not only play a role in electrodynamics, but is seen in all 
theories where degrees of freedom can be seen as ‘gauge’, such as all of the Stand-
ard Model Lagrangian, diffeomorphism invariance in relativity theory, and various 
approaches to quantum gravity.
One way to have signal locality is to choose the Lorenz gauge:  and  then obey 
the wave equation, just like  and  do. Agreed, besides the Lorenz gauge there are 
many conceivable positions to lying on the spectrum of Figure 1, and I suggest these 
should be explored on their philosophical merits and shortcomings. I have chosen 
to stay close to the original motivation for taking the potentials as physical, namely 
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locality. Emphasizing the desideratum of signal locality, I have suggested we should 
use the Lorenz gauge, because then the wave equation is satisfied by the potentials. 
It is true that the dynamics of the potentials in the Lorenz gauge is automatically 
Lorentz invariant, but this is also the case for other (relativistic) gauges. In conclu-
sion, I thus suggest we should narrow down further the Narrow Equivalence Class to 
the Lorenz Equivalence Class, with a scalar wave solution that encodes the residual 
gauge freedom, as the ontology of electrodynamics.
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